Contents of the volume

2017, Volume 70 - Issue 2

ISSN: 2499-8265
RSS feed citation: At RePEc
Publication date: 02 May 2017

THE EFFECT OF LABOR MARKET FREEDOM AND OTHER FACTORS ON U.S. SETTLEMENT PATTERN DECISIONS OF UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS, 2012 AND 2014

Richard Cebula, Maggie Foley

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DETERMINANTS OF THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF EDUCATION IN LOW-INCOME AND LOWER-MIDDLE INCOME COUNTRIES

Minh Quang Dao

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ON THE PROTECTION OF INVESTMENT CAPITAL DURING FINANCIAL CRISIS IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN EQUITY MARKET: A RISK-BASED ASSET ALLOCATION APPROACH

John Weirstrass Muteba Mwamba, Lamukanyani Mantshimuli

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THE IMPACT OF FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT ON INVESTMENT IN BOTSWANA: AN ARDL-BOUNDS TESTING APPROACH

Brian Muyambiri, Nicholas M. Odhiambo

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SYSTEMIC ANALYSIS OF TRADE LIBERALISATION: POLICY ENTREPRENUERSHIP AND BEHAVIOURAL VARIABLES IN A TWO-LEGAL GAME FRAMEWORK

Ivan Trofimov

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FDI, EXPORT SOPHISTICATIONS, AND EXPORT UPGRADING IN EMERGING ECONOMIES: EVIDENCE FROM CHINESE MANUFACTURINGS

Kevin Honglin Zhang

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Genoa Chamber of Commerce
Economia Internazionale / International Economics

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Corresponding author

Ivan TROFIMOV, Kolej Yayasan Saad (KYS) Business School, Ayer Keroh, Malaysia

Systemic Analysis of Trade Liberalisation: Policy Entreprenuership and Behavioural Variables in a Two-Legal Game Framework

Pages

217-244

Abstract

This paper presents a synthetic framework for the analysis of bilateral trade liberalisation process. It extends usual two-level game model (allowing interplay between domestic trade policy and GATT/WTO negotiation), and incorporates policy entrepreneurship processes (leadership, recombination, consensus-building), behavioural variables (intensity of interest in policy issue, attitudes towards gains and losses and cooperation), as well as systemic forces behind protectionist policies. The factors that determine the path, timing and outcome of the trade policy negotiation are tied in a formal model. The results point to the complementarity and mutual dependence of the factors, and the necessity to simultaneously attend to them during negotiation process. We also show that the success of trade liberalisation hinges upon readiness of the policy system for reform and prior exercise of advocacy and consensus building.

JEL classification

C70, F13, F51, L26

Keywords

Policy Entrepreneurship, Two-Level Games, Trade Policy

Index

  1. Introduction
  2. Principal elements of trade liberalisation framework
  3. Building the framework
  4. Game theoretic representation
  5. Conclusions

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